I examine earnings management around seasoned equity offerings and, consistent with Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) , find evidence of earnings management around the offerings.
Introduction
Earnings management around firm-specific events has received considerable attention from researchers in recent years.
1 These studies typically examine managers' reporting behavior around specific corporate events, and conclude that evidence of earnings management is consistent with managerial opportunism. However, relatively little is known about investor response to earnings management, particularly following firm-specific news releases that should alert investors to such earnings management. This paper examines both managerial reporting behavior and investors' response around public offerings of common stock. The results suggest that earnings management is explained by a rational expectations model at least as well as by managerial opportunism.
I hypothesize that managers overstate earnings before announcing seasoned equity offerings, and that an offering announcement reveals this overstatement to market participants.
Thus, on the announcement of an equity offering, investors lower their assessments of prior earnings surprises, and rationally discount firm value. The average price drop at the announcements of seasoned equity offerings is consistent with this investor conditioning process.
At first glance, the above hypothesis appears paradoxical. Why would issuing firms engage in earnings management if investors undo its effects at offering announcements? I argue that earnings management before equity offerings is not intended to mislead investors, but is instead the issuers' rational response to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements. Since issuers cannot credibly signal the absence of earnings management, investors treat all firms announcing an offering as having overstated prior earnings, and consequently discount their stock prices. Anticipating such market behavior, issuers rationally overstate earnings prior to offering announcements, at least to the extent expected by the market. Earnings management by issuers and the resulting discounting by investors is a unique Nash equilibrium in a prisoner's dilemma game between issuers and investors. I refer to this argument for earnings management as the "Managerial Response" hypothesis.
A secondary objective of this paper is to reexamine the evidence presented in two recent studies by Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) . Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) investigate whether earnings management before seasoned equity offerings causes the poor long-run stock performance following equity offerings, which originally appears in Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) . Both Rangan and Teoh et al. hypothesize that investors fail to recognize earnings management at the time of equity offerings and naively extrapolate pre-offering earnings increases. Consistent with their hypothesis, Rangan and Teoh et al. report a negative relation between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering abnormal stock returns, measured either as market-adjusted returns or as prediction errors from the Fama-French three-factor model. However, statistical tests based on these measures of abnormal returns are severely mis-specified owing to, among other factors, skewness in long-horizon returns data (see Warner, 1997 and Barber and Lyon, 1997) . Further, Kothari et al. (2000) show that such skewness combined with data attrition, either because of firms' survival or deletion of extreme observations, can induce spurious association between ex ante forecast variables (such as abnormal accruals) and ex post security returns. Hence I reexamine the evidence in Rangan's and Teoh et al. using alternative methodologies that previous research suggests are relatively well specified.
My paper is closely linked to a recent study by Erickson and Wang (1999) , who investigate earnings management around stock for stock mergers and show that acquiring firms overstate earnings in the pre-merger quarters. Erickson and Wang present several alternative explanations for their findings, including a rational expectations argument that acquirers overstate earnings before merger agreements because the target firms anticipate it and adjust for the anticipated earnings management when negotiating on purchase price.
However, Erickson and Wang do not test the hypothesis. I formalize their rational expectations argument and empirically examine the argument, albeit in the context of seasoned equity offerings rather than mergers.
The paper's major results are as follows: Consistent with earnings management, accruals are abnormally high before equity offerings, and they predict subsequent declines in net income. Also, consistent with the market learning about this earnings management through offering announcements, investors' response to unexpected earnings are significantly weaker following offering announcements. Further, the pre-announcement abnormal accruals predict the two-day negative price reaction to an offering announcement, which supports the view that investors rationally correct for earlier earnings management at offering announcements.
Finally, the negative relation between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering stock performance, documented by Rangan and Teoh et al., depends crucially on the choice of testing procedures and is not robust to methodologies that research shows are relatively well specified. These findings support the Managerial Response hypothesis for earnings management.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it proposes a nonopportunistic motive for earnings management, and challenges the frequently articulated view that earnings management around corporate events is synonymous with managerial opportunism. Second, by establishing a specific cause for the average price drop observed at (1993) (around initial public offerings), and Erickson and Wang (1999) (around stock-for-stock mergers).
offering announcements, it explains investors' response to such announcements. Third, the paper sheds new light on the debate on long-run stock price performance following equity offering announcements by reexamining the relation between earnings management and postissue stock price performance. Finally, by showing a weaker price response to earnings following an equity offering announcement, the paper enhances our understanding of the relation between accounting earnings and equity valuation.
The next section develops the hypotheses examined in this study. Section 3 discusses the measurement of earnings management. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 provides the summary and conclusions.
Hypothesis development

Managerial Response hypothesis
I model earnings management before equity offerings as the outcome of a rational expectations model: Investors expect firms announcing equity offerings to manage earnings and, consistent with this expectation, issuers overstate earnings before announcing their offerings. To formalize this argument, consider the game depicted in Figure 1 . If investors can directly observe the level of earnings overstatements in reported earnings, then the cooperative outcome given by box (1,1) in Figure 1 will be an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, only the unmanaged earnings (i.e., reported earnings excluding earnings management) will be priced at earnings releases, and offering announcements will not cause revisions in the stock price or in investors' beliefs about prior earnings. Moreover, the new shares in this equilibrium will be issued at their fundamental value.
However, in reality, investors cannot perfectly discern the amount of earnings management. In this situation, issuing firms have an incentive to deviate from the above equilibrium. By overstating earnings, a manager might attempt to fool investors and issue new shares at an artificially high price. Given this incentive, investors assume that firms announcing equity offerings have previously managed earnings upward, and therefore discount these firms' stock prices. 2 In this circumstance, even issuers who have not previously overstated earnings will suffer stock price declines at offering announcements, resulting in artificially low offer prices. Hence, it is only rational for issuers to overstate earnings before announcing an equity offering, at least to the extent expected by the market. This leads to box (2,2) in Figure 1 as the equilibrium outcome, which is in fact a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 3 However, this equilibrium is Pareto inefficient as long as there are nonzero costs to earnings management.
The above explanation also extends the Myers-Majluf (1984) 
Alternative hypotheses
A frequently advanced alternative to the Managerial Response hypothesis is that managers overstate earnings before seasoned equity offerings because of opportunism or hubris. By overstating earnings before an offering, managers seek to mislead investors and issue stocks at inflated prices. If investors fail to understand the transitory nature of earnings management, then when subsequent earnings decline unexpectedly, investors will be disappointed, and will lower the firm's assessed value. 4 This argument, in contrast to the Managerial Response hypothesis, does not predict negative returns at the time of the seasoned equity offerings, because investors do not decipher the earnings management signal in the offering announcement.
Although earnings management may benefit offering firms' managers and shareholders, it also has potential costs that can reduce the incentives for and ability of firms to manage earnings. First, if earnings overstatement causes losses to investors, there is increased likelihood of litigation from disgruntled investors and the attendant financial losses.
Second, earnings management that violates generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) may result in a qualified audit report adversely affecting the firm's reputation. Third, as shown by Dechow et al. (1996) , firms identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as violators of financial reporting requirements face an increase in their future costs of capital.
Finally, if illegal manipulation is discovered, managers face loss of reputation, loss of position, and criminal penalties.
Estimating earnings management
Following previous research, I use abnormal accruals in the quarters around an equity offering announcement as a measure of managerial discretion in reported earnings figures (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jones, 1991; DeAngelo, 1986; Healy, 1985) . Abnormal accruals (ABNACC it ) are defined as the difference between actual and expected accruals, where expected accruals are estimated using the Jones model (Jones, 1991) . 5 In the Jones model, expected accruals are estimated after controlling for changes in a firm's economic environment. More specifically, the model includes the change in revenues and gross property, plant and equipment as explanatory variables to control for the portion of accruals relating to less-discretionary changes in working capital accounts and depreciation expense. Expected accruals in this model are:
where ∆rev it is the change in revenues in period t from period t-1; gppe it is the gross property, plant and equipment at the end of period t; and a it-1 is the book value of total assets at the end 4 There is a growing body of evidence indicating that stock prices do not fully reflect information contained in current earnings and accruals (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Sloan, 1996.) 
where acc it is the actual accruals of firm i in period t, and b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 are the OLS estimates of β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 respectively. In order to have meaningful parameter estimates, I require the estimation sample to have at least 20 observations and exclude extreme observations using the DFFITS procedure in SAS.
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Although the paper primarily focuses on the empirical results obtained from the Jones model, these results remain qualitatively unchanged when abnormal accruals are estimated using either the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) or the extended Jones model presented by Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) . Moreover, decomposing total accruals into short-term and long-term accruals as in Teoh et al. does not materially alter any of the conclusions.
Empirical results
Sample description
The initial sample of equity offerings is obtained from Securities Data Corporation, and consists of 2,995 seasoned underwritten primary and secondary offerings between January 1983 and December 1992. I exclude firms making shelf offerings and combination offerings of equity and other securities. Further, utilities and financial companies are excluded as, owing 6 Errors in COMPUSTAT and some infrequent transactions (such as acquisitions and asset sales) affect accruals or cash flow estimates for firms in the estimation sample. Parameters estimated using these outliers substantially increase the noise in the estimates of abnormal accruals, reducing the power of the tests. When the influential observations are not deleted, the statistical significance of the results is weakened but the tenor of the results is unaffected.
to greater regulation for these firms, their ability to engage in earnings management might differ from those of industrial firms. For inclusion in the final sample, the issuing firms must have accounting data on the 1998 quarterly COMPUSTAT database.
For each equity offering in the sample, the first public announcement of the offering is obtained by searching the Dow Jones Text and LEXIS online services. To avoid confounding effects, issuers with another major news release occurring between the day preceding and the day following the offering announcement day are excluded. The data for stock returns are from the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily files.
Finally, as a matter of notation, I define event quarter -1 as the fiscal quarter for which earnings were last announced before an equity offering announcement. All other quarters are identified relative to this quarter. Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that managers of firms that require frequent external financing will report earnings conservatively to create a positive reputation in the market, from which they can benefit in subsequent offerings. Since the incentives of firms frequently raising external capital may differ from those of other firms, frequent issuers are excluded from the analyses. Frequent issuers are defined as firms with more than one public offering of seasoned common stock in a two-year period. This definition is based on the belief that an offering made within two years of another offering may be anticipated at the time of the earlier offering, which may change a manager's incentives to engage in earnings management. 
Offering firms' operating performance
To investigate whether firms overstate earnings around equity offerings, I initially analyze the abnormal net income of issuers in the eight quarters preceding and the eight quarters following the offering announcement. Then, given the evidence of earnings improvements in pre-announcement quarters, I examine the time profile of accruals and cash flows to evaluate their relative contribution to the increases in earnings.
To control for possible seasonalities, I compute abnormal net income using a seasonal random walk model. Thus, abnormal net income is defined as the change in net income from the corresponding quarter of the previous year. Throughout the paper I standardize all accounting variables by the beginning of period book value of total assets.
Columns 2-4 of Table 2 present the median abnormal net income and the associated sign tests in event quarters -8 through +7. In addition, Figure 2 plots the median abnormal net income. I report the medians as they are not likely to be influenced by extreme observations, although the qualitative results remain unchanged if I consider means rather than medians.
The number of observations for this analysis varies from 745 to 1,126, and tends to be higher in the post-event quarters because of the improved coverage and greater data availability on COMPUSTAT in the more recent years. The results show that offering firms experience significant improvements in their earnings in quarters -3 through 0. The median abnormal earnings vary from 0.12% to 0.18% of total assets during this period. Prior to quarter -3, median abnormal earnings tend to be insignificant and less than 0.10% in magnitude. The increase in earnings around the offering is temporary, however, with earnings declining from quarter +2. From quarter +2, abnormal earnings are all significantly negative. The general pattern of pre-offering increases in earnings, followed by subsequent earnings declines, is in line with the findings of Hansen and Crutchley (1990) , Loughran and Ritter (1997) , and Teoh et al. (1998) . 8 This earnings profile is consistent with managers borrowing income from future periods to enhance earnings immediately around equity offerings. However, this finding can also be interpreted as managers timing equity issues following periods of unusually good financial performance, which reflect long-run mean reversion in earnings (Fama and French, 2000) .
Next I examine the relative contributions of cash flow from operations and accruals to the observed pattern in net income. Columns 5-7 of Table 2 report the median abnormal cash flows measured using a seasonal random walk model. The results indicate that the net income profile is not mirrored by cash from operations. The median abnormal cash flows are insignificant in most event quarters and, if any, are actually negative immediately around the offering announcement. Therefore, new issues appear to occur when cash flows from operations are declining and not when they are at a peak. Consequently, the observed improvements in net income must be driven by the accrual component of earnings. Also, these findings suggest that, if managers are overstating earnings around equity offerings, they do not seem to use cash flows to do so.
Columns 8-10 of Table 2 report the median abnormal accruals estimated using the Jones model. The median abnormal accruals in quarters -8 through -5 are all positive, but not statistically significant. Between quarters -4 and +4 the medians are significantly positive, and vary from 0.33% to 1.08% of total assets. The abnormal accruals tend to be much higher during this period than during all other periods. From quarter +4 onwards, the median abnormal accruals are insignificantly different from zero. 9 This pattern of abnormal accruals is comparable to those reported in Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) . Rangan finds median abnormal accruals to be positive in quarters -4 to +4 around an offering announcement, although the medians are significant only in the two quarters immediately following the announcement. 10 Similarly, but using annual data, Teoh et al. report significantly positive abnormal accruals in years -3 to +2 around an offering.
The abnormal increase in accruals around equity offering announcements are consistent with issuers employing accruals to deliberately overstate earnings. However, neither the above analysis nor those in Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998) identify reversal of abnormal accruals in the post-offering period. Although one might expect abnormal accruals resulting from earnings management to reverse in the post-offering period, the above tests have low power in detecting it, as the reversals need not happen within a focussed time-period. Section 4.3 provides corroborative evidence for this argument.
The positive abnormal accruals in quarters 0 through 4 suggest that issuing firms possibly overstate earnings even after offering announcements. This, to some extent, should be expected given managerial incentives to avoid reporting reduced earnings immediately after an offering. For instance, the prospect of litigation following an offering heightens the pressure on management to meet the market's anticipated earnings, particularly if these earnings were influenced by managerial actions before the offering (that is, by optimistic earnings forecasts or postponement of bad news announcements). Also, underwriters of an issue may play a role in earnings management by encouraging the management to report favorable earnings after an offering in order to maintain their reputation in the market and to maintain their goodwill with clients.
Test of abnormal accruals as earnings management proxies
The abnormally high accruals around equity offerings are not unique to the hypothesis of managers overstating earnings. An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, interpretation is The result from this analysis, presented in Table 3 , shows that the profile of abnormal accruals in unaudited quarters is statistically indistinguishable from that reported in Table 2 for all quarters. The median abnormal accruals are significantly positive in event quarters -5 through +5 for this group. In contrast, with the exception of quarter -1, the median abnormal accruals are insignificant in all the audited quarters before the offering announcement. The evidence does not suggest earnings management in the audited quarters, particularly of the magnitude and frequency observed in unaudited quarters. Furthermore, the median abnormal accruals for the audited group are significantly negative in quarters +4 and +7, which is consistent with reversal of abnormal accruals from earlier quarters. 12 These results are consistent with managers using accruals to overstate earnings around equity offerings.
As an additional check for whether abnormal accruals measure earnings management before offering announcements, I examine the relation between pre-announcement abnormal accruals and post-announcement changes in net income. If offering firms use abnormal accruals to borrow income from the future, then a negative relation is expected between abnormal accruals around the offering and subsequent earnings changes. I test this prediction by regressing changes in net income on lagged abnormal accruals across the sample firms. In this regression, I use annual measures of abnormal accruals and earnings changes since the precise quarters in which earnings management occur are unknown. The annual measures are differences in sample size. Rangan's sample consists of 230 firms. 11 I checked the issue prospectus of a few randomly selected firms to see whether interim quarters prior to equity offerings are audited. I did not find any evidence of this.
constructed by aggregating quarterly data, and year -1 is defined to consist of quarters -4 through -1. Thus, the abnormal accruals in year -1 (ABNACC i (Yr -1)) are computed by cumulating abnormal accruals in quarters -4 through -1. Finally, the post-offeringannouncement changes in net income are computed relative to net income in year -2 to avoid spurious correlations that may arise if changes are measured relative to net income in year -1. Table 4 presents the regression results. The t-statistics for cross-sectional tests in Table   4 and elsewhere in the paper are based on White's heteroskedasticity consistent estimator for standard errors. When change in net income in year 0 is the dependent variable, the coefficients on abnormal accruals are insignificant. However, when change in net income in year 1 is the dependent variable, the coefficients on both ABNACC i (Yr -1) and on ABNACC i (Yr 0) are negative and statistically significant. The ability of abnormal accruals in years -1 and 0 to predict the changes in net income in year +1 is consistent with these abnormal accruals reversing in year +1. Moreover, the evidence of reversals occurring only in year +1 and not in year 0 supports the findings reported in Table 3 on accrual reversals occurring beyond quarter +3. These results are also in line with Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) , who document a negative relation between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering changes in net income.
Overall, the results are consistent with abnormal accruals representing earnings management. The evidence presented in this section, combined with the positive abnormal accruals reported in Table 2 , supports earnings management around equity offerings and is consistent with the findings of Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) . The remainder of the paper focuses on the investors' response to this earnings management.
Market reaction to earnings announcements around equity offerings
In order to examine whether offering announcements signal earnings overstatements, I
analyze investors' price response to earnings released around offering announcements. Before an offering announcement, investors would be unaware of the heightened incentives of issuers to overstate earnings, and as such would price unexpected earnings of all firms, both issuers and non-issuers, as if they included an average amount of discretion. This suggests that the earnings overstatements by issuers will lead to positive earnings surprises and positive market reaction at earnings releases before an offering announcement.
However, an offering announcement can signal the increased incentives for issuers to overstate earnings. This will aid market participants to better forecast subsequent earnings and may dampen their price response to earnings surprises in the post-announcement quarters.
This suggests that the price reaction to earnings releases will be systematically lower in the post-announcement quarters. In contrast, a finding of little change in investors' response after offering announcements would support the notion that investors are naive and fail to recognize earnings management by issuers. This section tests these predictions by analyzing the earnings announcement returns and the earnings response coefficients in the quarters before and after an offering announcement.
Earnings Announcement Returns
Earnings announcement returns for quarter k are defined as the cumulative abnormal returns during a six-day window (days -1 through +4) around the earnings announcement date (day 0). The six-day window for earnings announcement returns is intended to capture the delay in the market's response to earnings announcements, and is based on the findings of Bernard and Thomas (1989) that a disproportionately large percentage of the price response occurs within five days of an earnings announcement.
The abnormal returns are computed as the difference in returns between the sample firm and a growth-matched firm. This return-metric is motivated by the fact that a larger proportion of issuers tend to be growth firms when compared with non-issuers and growth firms are known to have smaller average returns, particularly around earnings announcements (Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta et al., 1997) . 13 The growth-matched firm is chosen amongst all firms that have market capitalization at the end of quarter -1 within 30% of the sample firm and whose growth rate of sales (measured over quarters -8 to -1) is closest to that of the sample firm.
The results presented in Table 5 show earnings announcement returns to be significantly positive in quarters -5 to -1. This is consistent with average unanticipated earnings being positive before offering announcements and with investors pricing the unanticipated earnings. However, in almost all quarters following the offering announcement, the mean earnings announcement returns are insignificantly different from zero and there is no discernable pattern. Even when earnings announcement returns are averaged across postannouncement quarters, the returns remain indistinguishable from zero. Finally, these results are robust across both large and small firms and across firms sorted on ABNACC i (Yr -1).
The significantly positive market reactions to earnings released before an offering announcement, followed by insignificant market reactions following the offering announcement, suggest that the offering announcement conveys information to investors regarding future earnings. These results do not support the view that investors are disappointed with earnings released after an offering announcement, and are consistent with the findings of Brous et al. (1999) and Hansen and Sarin (1998) . In analyses similar to those reported here, but using alternative benchmarks for earnings announcement returns, Brous et al. (1999) show that investors do not suffer systematic losses at earnings releases following an equity issue.
Further, Hansen and Sarin (1998) show that analysts' forecasts for issuers are not overly optimistic compared with similar growth firms.
14 Overall, the findings are consistent with offering announcements signaling earnings overstatement to investors and causing investors to revise their beliefs about future earnings.
There is no evidence to suggest that investors fail to undo earnings management by issuers or are systematically disappointed at earnings releases following an offering announcement.
Earnings Response Coefficients
As an alternative test of whether investors change their response to earnings released 13 The median issuer in the sample has sales growth of 39% in the two years prior to the offering announcement, while the median two-year-growth rate of all firms on COMPUSTAT is only 16% during the sample period. 14 I also analyze earnings announcement returns measured either as market-adjusted returns or as size-and-bookto-market adjusted returns. The size-and-book-to-market-adjusted returns are computed as the difference in returns between the issuer and a non-issuer matched by size and book-to-market ratio. Consistent with Jegadeesh (1999) and Denis and Sarin (1999) , earnings announcement returns based on these metrics are significantly negative in the post-offering period. However, consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1995) , similar results are obtained even during non-earnings-announcement periods. This indicates a potential bias in these return-metrics for studies of market response to earnings announcements. 15 The remainder of the paper is based on raw earnings announcement returns, although qualitatively identical results are obtained when alternative measures for earnings announcement returns are used. 
Earnings management and the market reaction to equity-offering announcements
Given that announcements of seasoned equity offerings cause investors to rationally change their beliefs about subsequently reported earnings figures, this section investigates whether the offering announcements also cause investors to correct misvaluations caused by earlier earnings management. Announcement of an SEO may cause investors to revise upward the probability that prior earnings numbers were overstated and, as a consequence, to lower the firm's stock price. This argument suggests a negative relation between the market's price reaction to offering announcements and pre-announcement earnings management. I test this prediction by regressing the price reaction at offering announcements on proxies for the earnings management. The specific proxies I consider are the earnings announcement returns and abnormal accruals in year -1.
The price reaction to the offering announcement, EQRET i , is computed as the cumulative returns on the day of and the day preceding the announcement. The mean two-day price reaction to SEO announcements in the sample is -2.1%. The raw earnings announcement returns (SDRET i (Yr -1)) and the abnormal accruals (ABNACC i (Yr -1)) in year -1 are computed by summing the corresponding quarterly variables in quarters -4 through -1. To control for issue and issuer characteristics, the regressions include the ratio of number of shares offered to the number of shares outstanding before the offering (OFFSIZE i ), the individual stock returns (RUNUP i ), and the market returns (MRUNUP i ) in the 60 trading days before the offering announcement. 16 If investors correct earlier mispricing at offering announcements, then a negative coefficient is expected both for the earnings announcement returns and for abnormal accruals in these regressions. Masulis and Korwar (1986) .
In regressions III and IV, which include ABNACC i (Yr -1) as an independent variable, the coefficient on ABNACC i (Yr -1) is about -0.03 and statistically significant. This result is consistent with results based on SDRET i (Yr -1), and shows that, irrespective of the proxy used to measure earnings management, a significant negative relation is observed between market price reaction to the offering announcements and prior earnings management. These findings support the notion that investors rationally infer earnings management from offering announcements and undo the effects of the earnings management at offering announcements. announcement return following offering announcements is due to issuers pre-releasing unfavorable earnings information. However, an alternative explanation, attributable to the criticisms leveled by Kothari and Warner (1997) , and Barber and Lyon (1997) on studies of long-horizon event studies, is that the evidence documented in Rangan and Teoh et al. is influenced by the choice of return metric and methodology. This is notwithstanding the fact that recent studies (e.g., Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Brav et al., 2000; Eckbo et 17 When the regressions are estimated separately for firms sorted into two groups based on their market capitalization at the end of quarter -1, negative coefficients are observed on SDRET i (Yr -1) and on ABNACC i (Yr -1) for both groups. However, the statistical significance of the results is weakened due to fewer observations in these regressions. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) show that statistical tests based on these measures of abnormal returns are severely mis-specified owing to, among other factors, skewness in the long-horizon returns data. Furthermore, Kothari et al. (2000) show that the skewness in long-horizon returns combined with data attrition, either because of firms' survival or deletion of extreme observations, can induce a statistically significant association between ex ante forecast variables (such as abnormal accruals) and ex post security returns. computed as the buy-and-hold returns over one-, two-and four-year horizons, beginning the day after the offering date. If a sample firm is delisted, its stock returns are set to zero for the rest of the period. The results are robust to setting the returns of delisted firms equal to the value-weighted market returns, as well as to truncating, rather than filling, the returns of delisted firms. Finally, the regressions include logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE i ) and the book-to-market ratio (BM i ) before the offering as control variables.
Hence, I test the robustness of the results in Rangan and
The estimates from the cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 8 . Focusing on columns (1) to (6), I find the coefficient estimate on abnormal accruals to be insignificant in regressions of the one-year-ahead returns. However, this result changes when returns are measured over two or four years following the offering. The coefficients on ABNACC i (Yr -1) are significantly negative for both raw returns and the market-adjusted returns. This is consistent with the findings of Rangan and Teoh et al. Moreover, the coefficient on SIZE i is significantly positive, which is consistent with the finding of Brav et al. (2000) that the postoffering stock underperformance is concentrated in the group of smallest issuers.
However, as noted earlier, long-horizon tests using raw returns and market-adjusted returns are known to be mis-specified. To control for this mis-specification, I initially use the control-firm approach suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) . Under this approach, abnormal returns are defined as the return of the sample firm less the return on a control firm, matched by size and book-to-market ratio. The control firm is chosen amongst all firms that have market values of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm and whose book-tomarket ratio is closest to that of the sample firm. 18 All variables for this matching are measured as of quarter -1. Barber and Lyon (1997) show that long-horizon tests based on this abnormal return metric are well-specified.
The results from this control firm approach are presented in columns (7) to (9) (10) and (11) of Table 8 .
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The results for both small and large firms are qualitatively similar to those discussed above.
For both subsamples, there is no significant relation between ABNACC i (Yr -1) and postoffering stock performance under the control-firm approach. 
Calendar-time portfolio approach
As an alternative to the control-firm approach, I use the calendar-time portfolio method advocated by Fama (1998) and employed in previous research by Jaffe ( ), Mandelker (1974 , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , and Brav and Gompers (1997) Panel A of Table 9 presents the time-series averages of raw returns, size, and book-tomarket ratios for each quintile. The average return for the lowest abnormal accrual quintile is 0.87%, while it is only 0.16% for the highest quintile. However, the returns do not monotonically decrease across the quintiles. Quintile 2 has the highest average return, at 1.35%, and the returns for both quintiles 3 and 4 are about 0.9%. Nonetheless, the difference in returns between the extreme quintiles, which can be viewed as the payoff from a strategy of buying stocks in the lowest quintile and shorting stocks in the highest quintile, is economically 21 The average month contains 161 observations. The two months before March 1983 and after October 1996 are omitted, as these months do not have sufficient observations to form quintiles. large (0.71%) and statistically significant. Moreover, the payoffs to this strategy are positive in nearly 58% of the months.
Looking at the average size and book-to-market ratios for the quintiles, it becomes apparent that the above strategy of buying quintile 1 and shorting quintile 5 may not be riskfree. Relative to firms in quintile 1, the firms in quintile 5 tend to be smaller and to have a lower book-to-market ratio. To control for differences in the risk exposure across the quintiles, I regress the monthly quintile returns (in excess of risk-free rate) on Fama-French factors (namely, the excess market return, SMB and HML) and then analyze the intercept from these regressions. 23 The regressions are carried out separately for each quintile. Table 9 reports the estimated intercepts with the associated t-statistics. The intercepts from the Fama-French model are insignificant for quintiles 1 to 4 and no pattern is discernible across these quintiles. However, the intercept is significantly negative for the highest abnormal accrual quintile. Also, the difference in the intercepts across extreme quintiles is a significant 0.0066. This suggests that the strategy of buying quintile 1 and shorting quintile 5 yields a monthly excess profit of 0.66% after controlling for risk exposures associated with Fama-French factors. This evidence is consistent with the arguments of Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998) that earnings management prior to stock offerings leads to stock underperformance in the post-offering period and supports managerial opportunism as a reason for the earnings management.
However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons. First, the above regressions assume that loadings on the Fama-French factors are constant over time.
This assumption is untenable given that the composition and number of firms in the quintiles 22 Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the calendar-time approach reduces the power of tests of long-run stock performance, since it weights each month equally, and ignores the possibility that the number of equity issues in a month could be related to the level of stock misvaluations. 23 I thank Gene Fama for providing the data on Fama-French factors.
change constantly. Secondly, firms in the highest abnormal accrual quintile are dominated by small and low book-to-market firms. For instance, over 70% of the firms in the highest abnormal accrual quintile are also in the lowest Fama-French (1993) book-to-market quintile. 24 Fama-French (1993 , 1996 show their model to be mis-specified for these firms and to yield average excess returns of as much as -0.45% per month. Although the samples are not directly comparable across this study and Fama and French (1993, 1996) , their results indicate that the negative intercept in Table 9 could, at least partly, reflect this misspecification.
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Due to the above limitations, I use an alternative approach to test whether differences in raw returns across extreme abnormal accrual quintiles persists after controlling for differences in firm characteristics. Specifically, I regress the return differential (R t,low-high ) across the extreme quintiles on differences in their size ((SIZE t,low-high ) and book-to-market ratios (BM t,low-high ). Since the composition and number of firms in the event quintiles change through time, the precision of the quintile returns will also vary over time. Hence, to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, I use the information contained in the cross-sectional standard errors of monthly quintile returns and estimate a generalized least-square regression assuming independence across quintile returns. 26 The coefficient estimates from the regression are as follows (t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates) R t,low-high = 0.002 + -0.12 (SIZE t,low-high ) + 0.056 (BM t,low-high ) ( 3 ) (0.58) (-0.79) (1.92) 24 The percentage is obtained by comparing book-to-market ratios of sample firms with the book-to-market values presented in Table 1 of Fama-French (1993) . Fama-French (1993) present the mean book-to-market for their 25 size-and-book-to-market sorted firms. This mean is then averaged across neighboring portfolios to obtain the upper and lower limits for each portfolio and these limits are used to categorize sample firms into the various Fama-French portfolios. 25 23% of firms in the highest abnormal accrual quintile are in the Fama-French's smallest size and lowest bookto-market quintiles. For the lowest abnormal accrual quintile, 58% of the firms are in the lowest Fama-French (1993) book-to-market quintile and 13% are in the smallest size and lowest book-to-market quintile. For quintiles 2 to 4, the percentages are similar to those for the lowest abnormal accrual quintile. 26 The result from ordinary least-square regression is qualitatively similar.
The insignificant intercept in the regression shows that the returns across the abnormal accrual quintiles are not significantly different from each other after controlling for differences in firm characteristics. Moreover, the coefficient on the book-to-market ratio is significantly positive, suggesting that the return differential observed across the extreme quintiles is attributable to differences in their book-to-market ratios. This also suggests that the strategy of buying the lowest quintile and shorting the highest quintile has a significant exposure to the risk factor associated with book-to-market ratio. Finally, the coefficient on size in this regression is negative, but insignificant. 27 These results indicate that pre-offering abnormal accruals do not predict the post-offering risk-adjusted returns. 27 The insignificant coefficient on size is consistent with the absence of size premium in the post-1983 period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2000) . 28 I repeat the above analyses by value-weighting (rather than equally-weighting) firms in each quintile. The qualitative results remain unaffected by this change. For instance, when firms are value-weighted, the difference in raw returns across extreme quintiles is 1.20% (t-stat=3.25) and the difference in intercepts from Fama-French model is 0.01 (t-stat=2.61). Finally, in the regression of return differentials on differences in firm characteristics, the intercept is -0.005 (t-stat=-0.80) and the coefficient on BM tlow-high is 0.031 (t-stat=2.26).
An advantage of the Fama-MacBeth procedure is that it does not assume time-invariant risk premiums, an assumption implicit in Regression (3) under the calendar-time portfolio approach. Moreover, as with the calendar-time portfolio approach, cross-correlation of returns across events and skewness in returns are not of much concern here. Table 10 presents the averages of the coefficients from the monthly cross-sectional regressions, together with the t-statistics computed as the mean coefficient estimate divided by its time-series standard error. The average coefficients on all the explanatory variables are insignificant, with the exception of the book-to-market ratio. The book-to-market ratio has a statistically positive coefficient of 0.006, which is consistent with previous studies (Fama and French, 1992) . The insignificant coefficient on ABNACC i (Yr -1) shows that pre-offering abnormal accruals do not predict future returns above and beyond book-to-market-ratio and Overall, the evidence in this study indicates that issuers overstate earnings before equity offerings, and that investors unravel this earnings management well before the actual offering. These findings are consistent with the Managerial Response hypothesis and suggest that earnings management before seasoned equity offerings is more likely the issuers' response to investors' expectations than indicative of managerial opportunism..
Summary and conclusions
This paper analyzes whether firms overstate earnings before seasoned equity offerings and whether, at offering announcements, investors recognize and undo the effects of such earnings management. Consistent with earnings management, net income and accruals are abnormally high around equity offerings and pre-offering abnormal accruals predict subsequent declines in net income. However, investors appear to rationally infer this earnings management at equity offerings announcements and, as a result, reduce their price response to unexpected earnings released after offering announcements. Also, at the offering announcement, investors seem to correct the price impact of earlier earnings management, as evidenced by a negative relation between pre-announcement abnormal accruals and the stock price reaction to the offering announcement.
In contrast to the above findings, Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) document a negative relation between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering abnormal stock returns, which they interpret as suggesting failure on the part of investors to recognize earnings management causing post-offering stock underperformance. However, the statistical tests based on the abnormal return metrics used in these studies have been shown to be biased (Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997) . Hence this paper reexamines the evidence presented in Rangan and in Teoh et al. and finds their results to depend crucially on their choice of abnormal return metrics. Their results are not robust to alternative methodologies that are known to be relatively well specified.
Overall, the results presented here indicate that investors unravel earnings management well before an equity offering, which at first glance seems to suggest that earnings management by issuers is wasteful on average. However, using a rational expectations framework, this paper shows that earnings management by issuers, rather than being intended to mislead investors, may actually be the rational response of issuers to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements. In a world with managerial discretion over accounting numbers, earnings management by issuers and subsequent price reversal by investors appears to be the unfortunate outcome.
translates to -0.007 to -0.057 when the dependent variable is not expressed in percentage, as done in this study. The sample consists of 1222 underwritten seasoned offerings of common stock by industrial firms over the period 1983 through 1992. The sample excludes offerings made within two years of each other. a The total assets, book value of equity and the market value of equity of the firms are measured at the end of the quarter -1. b Offering size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before the offering. The abnormal part of net income and cash from operations is estimated using a seasonal random walk model. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the Jones model for expected accruals
where ABNACC i (Qtr t) is the abnormal accruals for firm i in quarter t; acc it is accruals for firm i in quarter t; a it-1 is the book value of total assets at the end of quarter t-1; ∆rev it is the change in sales from quarter t-1 to quarter t; and gppe it is gross property, plant, and equipment at end of quarter t. For each sample firm and event quarter, the parameters β 1 through β 3 are estimated across all firms in the same two-digit SIC as the sample firm, and have the data available for the corresponding quarter. All variables are standardized by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the quarter. For each event quarter the sample firms are classified into audited and unaudited groups depending on whether the financial statements are for the fourth (financial) quarter or not. The abnormal accruals are computed using the Jones model (see footnotes to Table 2 ). ABNACC i (Yr 0) is the abnormal accruals in year 0 and is computed by cumulating abnormal accruals in quarters 0 through +3. The abnormal accruals in each event quarter is estimated using the Jones model. ABNACC i (Yr -1) is similarly defined for year -1. For years 0 and +1, ∆Net income is computed by subtracting the net income in year -2 from that year's net income. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Earnings announcement period consists of day -1 to +4 around the compustat earnings announcement date (day 0). The earnings announcement returns are computed by subtracting from raw returns, the returns of a matched non-issuing firm that has market capitalization within 30% of the sample firm and has the closest sales growth in prior two-years to the sample firm. The average returns across quarters are obtained by first computing the average returns for each firm, and then averaging these across firms. Small (large) firms are firms with market capitalization below (above) the median market capitalization. Low (high) accrual-firms are firms with abnormal accruals in year -1, ABNACC i (Yr -1), below (above) the median ABNACC i (Yr -1).
Table 6
Pooled regression of earnings announcement returns on abnormal net income. The price reaction to equity offering announcement (EQRET i ) is measured as the cumulative returns in the day of the and the day preceding the first public announcement of the offering. The earnings announcement return SDRET i (Yr -1) and the abnormal accruals ABNACC i (Yr-1) for year -1 are computed by summing the corresponding quarterly variables in quarters -4 through -1. The quarterly earnings announcement returns are the six-day cumulative returns in days -1 through +4 around the COMPUSTAT earnings announcement dates. The quarterly abnormal accruals are estimated from the Jones model. The regressions include the ratio of shares offered to shares outstanding before the offering, OFFSIZE i , and the daily compounded individual stock and market returns in the 60 trading days before offering announcement, RUNUP i and MRUNUP i , as control variables. Small (large) firms are firms with market capitalization below (above) the median market capitalization. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The raw returns are computed as the daily compounded returns over one, two or four-year period, beginning the day after the offering. ABNACC i (Yr -1) is the abnormal accruals from the Jones model in year -1, and is computed by summing quarterly abnormal accruals over event quarters -4 through -1. The market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the value-weighted market index from raw (buy and hold) returns. The control-firm adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the returns of a matched non-issuing firm from raw returns. The matched firm is chosen from all firms that have market capitalization within 30% of the sample firm, and has the closest book-to-market ratio to the sample firm. All regressions include log of firm size, SIZE i and the book-to-market ratio BM i before the offering. Small (large) firms are firms with market capitalization below (above) the median market capitalization. The t-statistics are provided within parentheses. Each month from March 1983 to October 1996, all sample firms that have made a seasoned equity offering in the previous 48 months are sorted into quintiles based on their abnormal accruals in year -1. The equally-weighted portfolio returns are computed for each month. The table presents the time-series averages and t-statistics for the returns. The row titled "%>0" gives the percentage of months in which the quintile returns are positive. For each quintile, the table also reports the average size (measured as logarithm of equity capitalization) and the book-to-market ratio, both measured at the end of year -1 and the intercepts from the Fama-French model. The intercepts are obtained from the following time-series regression of excess returns (R it -R f ) on the Fama-French factors: R it -R f = α i + b i (R M -R f ) + s i SMB + h i HML Each month from March 1983 to October 1996, the following cross-sectional regression is run across all firms that have made a seasoned equity offering in the previous 48 months: R i = γ 0 + γ 1 ABNACC i (Yr -1) + γ 2 BM i + γ 3 Size i + ε i where, R i is the monthly stock return of firm i, ABNACC i (Yr -1) is the abnormal accruals in year -1, Size i is the logarithm of equity capitalization and BM i is the book-to-market ratio. Both Size i and BM i are measured at end of quarter -1. This table presents the time-series averages and t-statistics for the coefficients estimates. The t-statistics is the mean coefficient estimate divided by the time-series standard error of the coefficient estimate. The column titled "%>0" gives the percentage of months in which the estimated coefficient is positive. The last column provides the p-value from the sign test of whether the percentage of months with positive coefficients is different from 50%.
Figure 1
Payoffs from earnings management game between offering firms and market participants.
Before offering announcement
(1) Firms do not overstate earnings Offering firms have two strategies. They can either overstate or not overstate their earnings prior to offering announcements. The market participants also have two strategies. They either believe or do not believe that earnings before offering announcements were overstated. If they believe prior earnings to be overstated, they revise stock prices downward at the announcement of an equity offering. The first entry in each box is the payoff to offering firms, while the second entry represents the payoff to market participants. H stands for a positive payoff and C stands for the costs of earnings management.
Figure 2
Median abnormal net income around equity offering announcements.
Abnormal net income is computed as the change in net income from the corresponding quarter of the previous year. 
